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Abstract. We consider non-atomic network congestion games with heteroge-
neous players where the latencies of the paths are subject to some bounded devi-
ations. This model encompasses several well-studied extensions of the classical
Wardrop model which incorporate, for example, risk-aversion, altruism or travel
time delays. Our main goal is to analyze the worst-case deterioration in social
cost of a deviated Nash flow (i.e., for the perturbed latencies) with respect to an
original Nash flow.
We show that for homogeneous players deviated Nash flows coincide with ap-
proximate Nash flows and derive tight bounds on their inefficiency. In contrast,
we show that for heterogeneous populations this equivalence does not hold. We
derive tight bounds on the inefficiency of both deviated and approximate Nash
flows for arbitrary player sensitivity distributions. Intuitively, our results suggest
that the negative impact of path deviations (e.g., caused by risk-averse behavior
or latency perturbations) is less severe than approximate stability (e.g., caused by
limited responsiveness or bounded rationality).
We also obtain a tight bound on the inefficiency of deviated Nash flows for ma-
troid congestion games and homogeneous populations if the path deviations can
be decomposed into edge deviations. In particular, this provides a tight bound on
the Price of Risk-Aversion for matroid congestion games.
1 Introduction
In 1952,Wardrop [16] introduced a simple model, also known as theWardrop model, to
study outcomes of selfish route choices in traffic networks which are affected by con-
gestion. In this model, there is a continuum of non-atomic players, each controlling an
infinitesimally small amount of flow, whose goal is to choose paths in a given network
to minimize their own travel times. The latency (or delay) of each edge is prescribed by
a non-negative, non-decreasing latency function which depends on the total flow on that
edge. Ever since its introduction, the Wardrop model has been used extensively, both
in operations research and traffic engineering studies, to investigate various aspects of
selfish routing in networks.
More recently, the classical Wardrop model has been extended in various ways to
capture more complex player behaviors. Examples include the incorporation of uncer-
tainty attitudes (e.g., risk-aversion, risk-seeking), cost alterations (e.g., latency perturba-
tions, road pricing), other-regarding dispositions (e.g., altruism, spite) and player biases
(e.g., responsiveness, bounded rationality).
Several of these extensions can be viewed as defining some modified cost for each
path which combines the original latency with some ‘deviation’ (or perturbation) along
that path. Such deviations are said to be β-bounded if the total deviation along each
path is at most β times the latency of that path. The player objective then becomes
to minimize the combined cost of latency and deviation along a path (possibly using
different norms). An equilibrium outcome corresponds to a β-deviated Nash flow, i.e.,
a Nash flow with respect to the combined cost. The deviations might be given explicitly
(e.g., as in the altruism model of Chen et al. [1]) or be defined implicitly (e.g., as in the
risk-aversion model of Nikolova and Stier-Moses [12]). Further, different fractions of
players might perceive these deviations differently, i.e., players might be heterogeneous
with respect to the deviations.
Another extension, which is closely related to the one above, is to incorporate dif-
ferent degrees of ‘responsiveness’ of the players. For example, each player might be
willing to deviate to an alternative route only if her latency decreases by at least a cer-
tain fraction. In this context, an equilibrium outcome corresponds to an ǫ-approximate
Nash flow for some ǫ ≥ 0, i.e., for each player the latency is at most (1 + ǫ) times the
latency of any other path. Here, ǫ is a parameter which reflects the responsiveness of
the players. An analogue definition can be given for populations with heterogeneous
responsiveness parameters.
To illustrate the relation between deviated and approximate Nash flows, suppose we
are given a β-deviated Nash flow f for some β ≥ 0, where the latency ℓP (f) of each
path P is perturbed by an arbitrary β-bounded deviation δP (f) satisfying 0 ≤ δP (f) ≤
βlP (f). Intuitively, the deviations inflate the latency on each path by at most a factor
of (1 + β). Further, assume that the population is homogeneous. From the Nash flow
conditions (see Section 2 for formal definitions), it follows trivially that f is also an
ǫ-approximate Nash flow with ǫ = β. But does the converse also hold? That is, can
every ǫ-approximate Nash flow be induced by a set of bounded path deviations? More
generally, what about the relation between deviated and approximate Nash flows for
heterogenous populations? Can we bound the inefficiency of these flows?
In this paper, we answer these questions by investigating the relation between the
two equilibrium notions. Our main goal is to quantify the inefficiency of deviated and
approximate Nash flows, both for homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. To this
aim, we study the (relative) worst-case deterioration in social cost of a β-deviated Nash
flow with respect to an original (unaltered) Nash flow; we use the term β-deviation ratio
to refer to this ratio. This ratio has recently been studied in the context of risk aversion
[8,12] and in the more general context of bounded path deviations [6]. Similarly, for
approximate Nash flows we are interested in bounding the ǫ-stability ratio, i.e., the
worst-case deterioration in social cost of an ǫ-approximate Nash flow with respect to an
original Nash flow.
Note that these notions differ from the classical price of anarchy notion [7], which
refers to the worst-case deterioration in social cost of a β-deviated (respectively, ε-
approximate) Nash flow with respect to an optimal flow. While the price of anarchy
typically depends on the class of latency functions (see, e.g., [1,2,6,12] for results in
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this context), the deviation ratio is independent of the latency functions but depends on
the topology of the network (see [6,12]).
Our contributions. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We show that for homogeneous populations the set of β-deviated Nash flows co-
incides with the set of ǫ-approximate Nash flows for β = ǫ. Further, we derive an
upper bound on the ǫ-stability ratio (and thus also on the ǫ-deviation ratio) which is
at most (1 + ǫ)/(1 − ǫn), where n is the number of nodes, for single-commodity
networks. We also prove that the upper bound we obtain is tight for generalized
Braess graphs. These results are presented in Section 4.
2. We prove that for heterogenous populations the above equivalence does not hold.
We derive tight bounds for both the β-deviation ratio and the ǫ-stability ratio for
single-commodity instances on series-parallel graphs and arbitrary sensitivity dis-
tributions of the players. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first ineffi-
ciency results in the context of heterogenous populations which are tight for ar-
bitrary sensitivity distributions. Our bounds show that both ratios depend on the
demands and sensitivity distribution γ of the heterogenous players (besides the re-
spective parameters β and ǫ). Further, it turns out that the β-deviation ratio is always
at most the ǫ-stability ratio for ǫ = βγ. These results are given in Section 3.
3. We also derive a tight bound on the β-deviation ratio for single-commodity ma-
troid congestion games and homogeneous populations if the path deviations can
be decomposed into edge deviations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
result in this context which goes beyond network congestion games. In particular,
this gives a tight bound on the Price of Risk-Aversion [12] for matroid congestion
games. This result is of independent interest and presented in Section 4.
In a nutshell, our results reveal that for homogeneous populations there is no quan-
titative difference between the inefficiency of deviated and approximate Nash flows in
the worst case. In contrast, for heterogenous populations the β-deviation ratio is always
at least as good as the ǫ-stability ratio with ǫ = βγ. Intuitively, our results suggest
that the negative impact of path deviations (e.g., caused by risk-averse behavior or la-
tency perturbations) is less severe than approximate stability (e.g., caused by limited
responsiveness or bounded rationality).
Related work. We give a brief overview of the works which are most related to our re-
sults. Christodoulou et al. [2] study the inefficiency of approximate equilibria in terms
of the price of anarchy and price of stability (for homogeneous populations). General-
ized Braess graphs were introduced by Roughgarden [13] and are used in many other
lower bound constructions (see, e.g., [3,6,13]). Chen et al. [1] study an altruistic ex-
tension of the Wardrop model and, in particular, also consider heterogeneous altruistic
populations. They obtain an upper bound on the ratio between an altruistic Nash flow
and a social optimum for parallel graphs, which is tight for two sensitivity classes. It
is mentioned that this bound is most likely not tight in general. Meir and Parkes [10]
study player-specific cost functions in a smoothness framework [14]. Some of their in-
efficiency results are tight, although none of their bounds seems to be tight for arbitrary
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sensitivity distributions. Matroids have also received some attention in the Wardrop
model. In particular, Fujishige et al. [5] show that matroid congestion games are im-
mune against the Braess paradox (and their analysis is tight in a certain sense). We refer
the reader to [6] for additional references and relations of other models to the bounded
path deviation model considered here.
2 Preliminaries
Let I = (E, (le)e∈E , (Si)i∈[k], (ri)i∈[k]) be an instance of a non-atomic congestion
game. Here, E is the set of resources (or edges, or arcs) that are equipped with a non-
negative, non-decreasing, continuous latency function le : R≥0 → R≥0. Each com-
modity i ∈ [k] has a strategy set Si ⊆ 2E and demand ri ∈ R>0. Note that in general
the strategy set Si of player i is defined by arbitrary resource subsets. If each strategy
P ∈ Si corresponds to an si, ti-path in a given directed graph, then the corresponding
game is called a network congestion game.3 We slightly abuse terminology and use the
term path also to refer to a strategy P ∈ Si of player i (which does not necessarily
correspond to a path in a graph); no confusion shall arise. We denote by S = ∪iSi the
set of all paths.
An outcome of the game is a (feasible) flow f i : Si → R≥0 satisfying
∑
P∈Si
f iP =
ri for every i ∈ [k]. We use F(S) to denote the set of all feasible flows f =
(f1, . . . , fk). Given a flow f = (f i)i∈[k] ∈ F(S), we use f
i
e to denote the total flow
on resource e ∈ E of commodity i ∈ [k], i.e., f ie =
∑
P∈Si:e∈P
f iP . The total flow on
edge e ∈ E is defined as fe =
∑
i∈[k] f
i
e.
The latency of a path P ∈ S with respect to f is defined as lP (f) :=
∑
e∈P le(fe).
The cost of commodity i with respect to f is Ci(f) =
∑
P∈Si
fP lP (f). The social cost
C(f) of a flow f is given by its total average latency, i.e., C(f) =
∑
i∈[k] Ci(f) =∑
e∈E fele(fe). A flow that minimizes C(·) is called (socially) optimal.
If the population is heterogenous, then each commodity i ∈ [k] is further partitioned
in hi sensitivity classes, where class j ∈ [hi] has demand rij such that ri =
∑
j∈[hi]
rij .
Given a path P ∈ Si, we use fP,j to refer to the amount of flow on path P of sensitivity
class j (so that
∑
j∈[hi]
fP,j = fP ).
Deviated Nash flows. We consider a bounded deviation model similar to the one intro-
duced in [6].4 We use δ = (δP )P∈S to denote some arbitrary path deviations, where
δP : F(S)→ R≥0 for all P ∈ S. Let β ≥ 0 be fixed. Define the set of β-bounded path
deviations as∆(β) = {(δP )P∈S | 0 ≤ δP (f) ≤ βlP (f) for all f ∈ F(S)}.
Every commodity i ∈ [k] and sensitivity class j ∈ [hi] has a non-negative sensitivity
γij with respect to the path deviations. The population is homogeneous if γij = γ for
all i ∈ [k], j ∈ [hi] and some γ ≥ 0; otherwise, it is heterogeneous. Define the deviated
latency of a path P ∈ Si for sensitivity class j ∈ [hi] as q
j
P (f) = lP (f) + γijδP (f).
3 If a network congestion game with a single commodity is considered (i.e., k = 1), we omit
the commodity index for ease of notation.
4 In fact, in [6] more general path deviations are introduced; the path deviations considered here
correspond to (0, β)-path deviations in [6].
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We say that a flow f is a β-deviated Nash flow if there exist some β-bounded path
deviations δ ∈ ∆(β) such that
∀i ∈ [k], ∀j ∈ [hi], ∀P ∈ Si, fP,j > 0 : q
j
P (f) ≤ q
j
P ′(f) ∀P
′ ∈ Si. (1)
We define the β-deviation ratio β-DR(I) as the maximum ratio C(fβ)/C(f0) of an
β-deviated Nash flow fβ and an original Nash flow f0. Intuitively, the deviation ratio
measures the worst-case deterioration in social cost as a result of (bounded) deviations
in the path latencies. Note that here the comparison is done with respect to an unaltered
Nash flow to measure the impact of these deviations.
The set ∆(β) can also be restricted to path deviations which are defined as a func-
tion of edge deviations along that path. Suppose every edge e ∈ E has a deviation
δe : R≥0 → R≥0 satisfying 0 ≤ δe(x) ≤ βle(x) for all x ≥ 0. For example, feasible
path deviations can then be defined by the L1-norm objective δP (f) =
∑
e∈P δe(x) (as
in [6,12]) or the L2-norm objective δP (f) =
√∑
e∈P δe(x)
2) (as in [12,8]). The Price
of Risk-Aversion introduced by Nikolova and Stier-Moses [12] is technically the same
ratio as the deviation ratio for the L1- and L2-norm (see [6] for details).
Approximate Nash flows. We introduce the notion of an approximate Nash flow. Also
here, each commodity i ∈ [k] and sensitivity class j ∈ [hi] has a non-negative sensitiv-
ity ǫij . We say that the population is homogeneous if ǫij = ǫ for all i ∈ [k], j ∈ [hi]
and some ǫ ≥ 0; otherwise, it is heterogeneous.
A flow f is an ǫ-approximate Nash flow with respect to sensitivities ǫ =
(ǫij)i∈[k],j∈[hi] if
∀i ∈ [k], ∀j ∈ [hi], ∀P ∈ Si, fP,j > 0 : lP (f) ≤ (1+ ǫij)lP ′(f) ∀P
′ ∈ Si (2)
Note that a 0-approximate Nash flow is simply a Nash flow. We define the ǫ-stability
ratio ǫ-SR(I) as the maximum ratio C(f ǫ)/C(f0) of an ǫ-approximate Nash flow f ǫ
and an original Nash flow f0.
Some of the proofs are missing in the main text below and can be found in the
appendix.
3 Heterogeneous populations
We first elaborate on the relation between deviated and approximate Nash flows for
general congestion games with heterogeneous populations.
Proposition 1. Let I be a congestion game with heterogeneous players. If f is a β-
deviated Nash flow for I, then f is an ǫ-approximate Nash flow for I with ǫij = βγij
for all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [hi] (for the same demand distribution r).
Discrete sensitivity distributions. Subsequently, we show that the reverse of Proposition
1 does not hold. We do this by providing tight bounds on the β-deviation ratio and the
ǫ-stability ratio for instances on (single-commodity) series-parallel graphs and arbitrary
discrete sensitivity distributions.
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Theorem 1. Let I be a single-commodity network congestion game on a series-
parallel graph with heterogeneous players, demand distribution r = (ri)i∈[h] nor-
malized to 1, i.e.,
∑
j∈[h] ri = 1, and sensitivity distribution γ = (γi)i∈[h], with
γ1 < γ2 < · · · < γh. Let β ≥ 0 be fixed and define ǫ = (βγi)i∈[h]. Then the ǫ-stability
ratio and the β-deviation ratio are bounded by:
ǫ-SR(I) ≤ 1 + β
h∑
j=1
rjγj and β-DR(I) ≤ 1 + β ·max
j∈[h]
{
γj
( h∑
p=j
rp
)}
. (3)
Further, both bounds are tight for all distributions r and γ.
It is not hard to see that the bound on the β-deviation ratio is always smaller than the
bound on the ǫ-stability ratio.5 Our bound on the β-deviation ratio also yields tight
bounds on the Price of Risk-Aversion [12] for series-parallel graphs and arbitrary het-
erogeneous risk-averse populations, both for the L1-norm and L2-norm objective.
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We need the following technical lemma for the proof of the β-deviation ratio.
Lemma 1. Let 0 ≤ τk−1 ≤ · · · ≤ τ1 ≤ τ0 and ci ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , k be given. We
have c1τ0 +
∑k−1
i=1 (ci+1 − ci)τi ≤ τ0 ·maxi=1,...,k{ci}.
Proof (Theorem 1, β-deviation ratio). Let x = fβ be a β-deviated Nash flow with path
deviations (δP )P∈S ∈ ∆(β) and let z = f0 be an original Nash flow. Let X = {a ∈
A : xa > za} and Z = {a ∈ A : za ≥ xa and za > 0} (arcs with xa = za = 0 may be
removed without loss of generality).
In order to analyze the ratio C(x)/C(z) we first argue that we can assume without
loss of generality that the latency function la(y) is constant for values y ≥ xa for all
arcs a ∈ Z . To see this, note that we can replace the function la(·) with the function lˆa
defined by lˆa(y) = la(xa) for all y ≥ xa and lˆa(y) = la(y) for y ≤ xa. In particular,
this implies that the flow x is still a β-deviated Nash flow for the same path deviations
as before. This holds since for any path P the latency lP (x) remains unchanged if we
replace the function la by lˆa.
By definition of arcs in Z , we have xa ≤ za and therefore lˆa(za) = la(xa) ≤
la(za). Let z
′ be an original Nash flow for the instance with la replaced by lˆa. Then we
have C(z′) ≤ C(z) using the fact that series-parallel graphs are immune to the Braess
paradox, see Milchtaich [11, Lemma 4]. Note that, in particular, we find C(x)/C(z) ≤
C(x)/C(z′). By repeating this argument, we may without loss of generality assume
that all latency functions la are constant between xa and za for a ∈ Z . Afterwards,
we can even replace the function lˆa by a function that has the constant value of la(xa)
everywhere.
In the remainder of the proof, we will denote Pj as a flow-carrying arc for sensi-
tivity class j ∈ [h] that maximizes the path latency amongst all flow-carrying path for
sensitivity class j ∈ [h], i.e., Pj = argmaxP∈P:xP,j>0{lP (x)}. Moreover, there also
5 This follows from Markov’s inequality: for a random variable Y , P (Y ≥ t) ≤ E(Y )/t.
6 Observe that we show tightness of the bound on parallel arcs, in which case these objectives
coincide.
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exists a path P0 with the property that za ≥ xa and za > 0 for all arcs a ∈ P0 (see,
e.g., Lemma 2 [11]).
For fixed a < b ∈ {1, . . . , h}, the Nash conditions imply that (these steps are of a
similar nature as Lemma 1 [4])
lPa(x) + γa · δPa(x) ≤ lPb(x) + γa · δPb(x)
lPb(x) + γb · δPb(x) ≤ lPa(x) + γb · δPa(x).
Adding up these inequalities implies that (γb − γa)δPb(x) ≤ (γb − γa)δPa(x), which
in turn yields that δPb(x) ≤ δPa(x) (using that γa < γb if a < b). Furthermore, we also
have
lP1(x) + γ1δP1(x) ≤ lP0(x) + γ1δP0(x), (4)
and lP0(x) = lP0(z) ≤ lP1(z) ≤ lP1(x), which can be seen as follows. The equality
follows from the fact that la is constant for all a ∈ Z and, by choice, P0 only consists
of arcs in Z . The first inequality follows from the Nash conditions of the original Nash
flow z, since there exists a flow-decomposition in which the path P0 is used (since the
flow on all arcs of P0 is strictly positive in z). The second inequality follows from the
fact that∑
e∈P1
le(ze) =
∑
e∈P1∩X
le(ze) +
∑
e∈P1∩Z
le(ze) ≤
∑
e∈P1∩X
le(xe) +
∑
e∈P1∩Z
le(xe)
using that ze ≤ xe for e ∈ X and the fact that latency functions for e ∈ Z are constant.
In particular, we find that lP0(x) ≤ lP1(x). Adding this inequality to (4), we obtain
γ1δP1(x) ≤ γ1δP0(x) and therefore δP1(x) ≤ δP0(x). Thus δPh(x) ≤ δPh−1(x) ≤
· · · ≤ δP1(x) ≤ δP0(x). Moreover, by using induction (see appendix) it can be shown
that
lPj (x) ≤ lP0(x) + γ1δP0(x) +
[ j−1∑
g=1
(γg+1 − γg)δPg (x)
]
− γjδPj (x). (5)
Using (5), we then have
C(x) ≤
h∑
j=1
rj lPj (x) (by choice of the paths Pj)
≤
h∑
j=1
rj
(
lP0(x) + γ1δP0(x) +
[ j−1∑
g=1
(γg+1 − γg)δPg (x)
]
− γjδPj (x)
)
= lP0(x) + γ1δP0(x) +
h∑
j=1
(rj+1 + · · ·+ rh)(γj+1 − γj)δPj (x) − rjγjδPj (x)
≤ lP0(x) + γ1δP0(x)
+
h−1∑
j=1
[
(rj+1 + · · ·+ rh)γj+1 − (rj + rj+1 + · · ·+ rh)γj
]
δPj (x)
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In the last inequality, we leave out the last negative term −rhγhδPh(x). Note that γ1 =
(r1+ · · ·+rh)γ1 since we have normalized the demand to 1. We can then apply Lemma
1 with τi = δPi(x) for i = 0, . . . , h − 1 and ci = γi ·
∑h
p=i rp for i = 1, . . . , k.
Continuing the estimate, we get
C(x) ≤ lP0(x) + max
j∈[h]
{
γj ·
h∑
p=j
rp
}
· δP0(x) ≤
[
1 + β ·max
j∈[h]
{
γj
( h∑
p=j
rp
)}]
C(z)
where for the second inequality we use that δP0(x) ≤ βlP0(x), which holds by defini-
tion, and lP0(x) = lP0(z) = C(z), which holds because z is an original Nash flow and
all arcs in P0 have strictly positive flow in z (and because of the fact that that all arcs in
P0 have a constant latency functions).
To prove tightness, fix j ∈ [h] and consider the following instance on two arcs.
We take (l1(y), δ1(y)) = (1, β) and (l2(y), δ2(y)) with δ2(y) = 0 and l2(y) a strictly
increasing function satisfying l2(0) = 1 + ǫ and l2(rj + rj+1 + · · ·+ rh) = 1 + γjβ,
where ǫ < γjβ. The (unique) original Nash flow is given by z = (z1, z2) = (1, 0)
with C(z) = 1. The (unique) β-deviated Nash flow x is given by x = (x1, x2) =
(r1 + r2 + · · ·+ rj−1, rj + rj+1 + · · ·+ rh) with C(x) = 1 + β · γj(rj + · · ·+ rh).
Since this construction holds for all j ∈ [h], we find the desired lower bound. ⊓⊔
Continuous sensitivity distributions. We obtain a similar result for more general (not
necessarily discrete) sensitivity distributions. That is, we are given a Lebesgue inte-
grable sensitivity density function ψ : R≥0 → R≥0 over the total demand. Since we can
normalize the demand to 1, we have the condition that
∫∞
0
ψ(y)dy = 1. We then find
the following natural generalizations of our upper bounds:
1. ǫ-SR(I) ≤ 1 + β
∫∞
0
y · ψ(y)dy, and
2. β-DR(I) ≤ 1 + β · supt∈R≥0
{
t ·
∫∞
t ψ(y)dy
}
.
These bounds are both asymptotically tight for all distributions. Details are given in
Corollary 1 in the appendix.
4 Homogeneous population
The reverse of Proposition 1 also holds for homogeneous players in single-commodity
instances. As a consequence, the set of β-deviated Nash flows and the set of ǫ-
approximate Nash flows with ǫ = βγ coincide in this case.
Recall that for homogeneous players we have γij = γ for all i ∈ [k], j ∈ [hi] and
some γ ≥ 0.
Proposition 2. Let I be a single-commodity congestion game with homogeneous play-
ers. f is an ǫ-approximate Nash flow for I if and only if f is a β-deviated Nash flow for
I with ǫ = βγ.
Upper bound on the stability ratio. Our main result in this section is an upper bound
on the ǫ-stability ratio. Given the above equivalence, this bound also applies to the β-
deviation ratio with ǫ = βγ.
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The following concept of alternating paths is crucial. For single-commodity in-
stances an alternating path always exists (see, e.g., [12]).
Definition 1 (Alternating path [9,12]). Let I be a single-commodity network conges-
tion game and let x and z be feasible flows. We partition the edgesE = X∪Z such that
Z = {a ∈ E : za ≥ xa and za > 0} and X = {a ∈ E : za < xa or za = xa = 0}.
We say that π is an alternating s, t-path if the arcs in π∩Z are oriented in the direction
of t, and the arcs in π ∩ X are oriented in the direction of s. We call the number of
backward arcs on π the backward length of π and refer to it by q(π) = |π ∩X |.
Theorem 2. Let I be a single-commodity network congestion game. Let ǫ ≥ 0 be
fixed and consider an arbitrary alternating path π with backward length q = q(π). If
ǫ < 1/q, then the ǫ-stability ratio is bounded by
ǫ-SR(I) ≤
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ · q
≤
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ · n
.
Note that the restriction on ǫ stated in the theorem always holds if ǫ < 1/n. In
particular, for ǫ ≪ 1/n we roughly get ǫ-SR(I) ≤ 1 + ǫn. The proof of Theorem 2
is inspired by a technique of Nikolova and Stier-Moses [12], but technically more in-
volved.
Proof. Let x = f ǫ be an ǫ-approximate Nash flow and let z = f0 an original Nash
flow. Let π = Z1X1Z2X2 . . . Zη−1Xη−1Zη be an alternating path for x and z, where
Zi and Xi are maximal sections consisting of consecutive arcs, respectively, in Z and
X (i.e., Zi ⊆ Z and Xi ⊆ X for all i). Furthermore, we let qi = |Xi| and write
Xi = (Xiqi , . . . , Xi2, Xi1), whereXij are the arcs in the sectionXi. By definition, for
every arcXij there exists a path CijXijDij that is flow-carrying for x.
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For convenience, we define C01 = Dη,0 = ∅. Furthermore, we denote Pmax as a
path maximizing lP (x) over all paths P ∈ S. For convenience, we will abuse notation,
and write Q = Q(x) =
∑
a∈Q la(x) for Q ⊆ E.
Note that for all i, j:
Cij(x) +Xij(x) +Dij(x) ≤ P
max(x). (6)
Fix some i ∈ {1, . . . , η−1}. Then we haveCi1+Xi1+Di1 ≤ (1+ ǫ)(Ci−1,qi−1 +
Zi +Di1) by definition of an ǫ-approximate Nash flow. This implies that (leaving out
Di1 on both sides)
Ci1 +Xi1 ≤ (1 + ǫ)Zi + Ci−1,qi−1 + ǫ(Ci−1,qi−1 +Di1).
Furthermore, for all j ∈ {2, . . . , qi}, we haveCij+Xij+Dij ≤ (1+ǫ)(Ci,j−1+Dij)
which implies (again leaving outDij on both sides)
Cij +Xij ≤ Ci,j−1 + ǫ(Ci,j−1 +Dij).
7 Note that for a Nash flow one can assume that there is a flow-carrying path traversing all arcs
Xiqi , . . . , Xi1; but this cannot be done for an approximate Nash flow.
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Fig. 1. Sketch of the situation in the proof of Theorem 2 with q1 = 1 and q2 = 2.
Adding up these inequalities for j ∈ {1, . . . , qi} and subtracting
∑qi−1
j=1 Cij from both
sides, we obtain for all i ∈ {1, . . . , η − 1}
Ci,qi +
qi∑
j=1
Xij ≤ Ci−1,qi−1 + (1 + ǫ)Zi+ ǫ
( qi∑
j=1
Dij +Ci−1,qi−1 +
qi−1∑
j=1
Cij
)
. (7)
Moreover, we also have
Pmax ≤ (1 + ǫ)(Cη−1,η−1 + Zη) = Cη−1,η−1 + (1 + ǫ)Zη + ǫCη−1,η−1. (8)
Adding up the inequalities in (7) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , η − 1}, and the inequality in (8),
we obtain
Pmax+
η−1∑
i=1
Ci,qi +
η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Xij ≤
η−1∑
i=1
Ci,qi +(1+ ǫ)
η∑
i=1
Zi+ ǫ
( η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Cij +Dij
)
which simplifies to
Pmax +
η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Xij ≤ (1 + ǫ)
η∑
i=1
Zi + ǫ
( η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Cij +Dij
)
. (9)
Using (6), we obtain
η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Cij +Dij ≤
η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Pmax −Xij =
( η−1∑
i=1
qi
)
Pmax −
η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Xij .
Combining this with (9), and rearranging some terms, we get
(1 − ǫ · q)Pmax ≤ (1 + ǫ)
[ η∑
i=1
Zi −
η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Xij
]
= (1 + ǫ)
[ ∑
e∈Z∩π
le(xe)−
∑
e∈X∩π
le(xe)
]
where q = q(π) =
∑η−1
i=1 qi is the backward length of π.
Similarly (see also [12, Lemma 4.5]), it can be shown that
lQ(z) ≥
∑
e∈Z∩π
le(ze)−
∑
e∈X∩π
le(ze) (10)
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for any pathQ with zQ > 0 (these all have the same latency, since z is an original Nash
flow). Using a similar argument as in [12, Theorem 4.6], we obtain
(1− ǫ · q)lPmax(x) ≤ (1 + ǫ)
[ ∑
e∈Z∩π
le(xe)−
∑
e∈X∩π
le(xe)
]
≤ (1 + ǫ)
[ ∑
e∈Z∩π
le(ze)−
∑
e∈X∩π
le(ze)
]
≤ (1 + ǫ)lQ(z).
By multiplying both sides with the demand r, we obtain (1− ǫ · q)C(x) ≤ (1− ǫ · q)r ·
lPmax(x) ≤ (1 + ǫ)r · lQ(z) = (1 + ǫ)C(z) for ǫ < 1/q, which proves the claim. ⊓⊔
Tight bound on the stability ratio. In this section, we consider instances for which all
backward sections of the alternating path π consist of a single arc., i.e., qi = 1 for all
i = 1, . . . , η−1. We then have q =
∑η−1
i=1 qi ≤ ⌊n/2⌋−1 since every arc inX must be
followed directly by an arc in Z (and we can assume w.l.o.g. that the first and last arc
are contained in Z). By Theorem 2, we obtain ǫ-SR(I) ≤ (1+ ǫ)/(1− ǫ · (⌊n/2⌋− 1))
for all ǫ < 1/(⌊n/2⌋− 1). We show that this bound is tight. Further, we show that there
exist instances for which ǫ-SR(I) is unbounded for ǫ ≥ 1/(⌊n/2⌋−1). This completely
settles the case of qi = 1 for all i.
Our construction is based on the generalized Braess graph [13]. By construction,
alternating paths for these graphs satisfy qi = 1 for all i (see Figure 2 in the appendix
for an example and a formal definition of these graphs).
Theorem 3. Let n = 2m be fixed and let Bm be the set of all instances on the general-
ized Braess graph with n nodes. Then
sup
I∈Bm
ǫ-SR(I) =
{
1+ǫ
1−ǫ·(⌊n/2⌋−1) if ǫ <
1
⌊n/2⌋−1 ,
∞ otherwise.
Non-symmetric matroid congestion games. In the previous sections, we considered
(symmetric) network congestion games only. It is interesting to consider other combi-
natorial strategy sets as well. In this section we make a first step in this direction by
focusing on the bases of matroids as strategies.
A matroid congestion game is given by J = (E, (le)e∈E , (Si)i∈[k], (ri)i∈[k]), and
matroidsMi = (E, Ii) over the ground set E for every i ∈ [k].8 The strategy set Si
consists of the bases of the matroidMi, which are the independent sets of maximum
size, e.g., spanning trees in an undirected graph. We refer the reader to Schrijver [15]
for an extensive overview of matroid theory.
As for network congestion games, it can be shown that in general the ǫ-stability
ratio can be unbounded (see Theorem 5 in the appendix); this also holds for general path
deviations because the proof of Proposition 2 in the appendix holds for arbitrary strategy
8 A matroid over E is given by a collection I ⊆ 2E of subsets of E (called independent sets).
The pairM = (E, I) is amatroid if the following three properties hold: i) ∅ ∈ I; ii) IfA ∈ I
and B ⊆ A, then B ∈ I. iii) If A,B ∈ I and |A| > |B|, then there exists an a ∈ A \B such
that B + a ∈ I.
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sets. However, if we consider path deviations induced by the sum of edge deviations (as
in [12,6]), then we can obtain a more positive result for general matroids.
Recall that for every resource e ∈ E we have a deviation function δe : R≥0 → R≥0
satisfying 0 ≤ δe(x) ≤ βle(x) for all x ≥ 0. The deviation of a basis B is then given
by δB(f) =
∑
e∈B δe(fe).
Theorem 4. Let J = (E, (le)e∈E , (Si)i∈[k], (ri)i∈[k]) be a matroid congestion game
with homogeneous players. Let β ≥ 0 be fixed and consider β-bounded basis deviations
as defined above. Then the β-deviation ratio is upper bounded by β-DR(J ) ≤ 1 + β.
Further, this bound is tight already for 1-uniform matroid congestion games.
Acknowledgements.We thank the anonymous referees for their very useful comments,
and one reviewer for pointing us to Lemma 1 [4].
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A Omitted material of Section 3
Proposition 1. Let I be a congestion game with heterogeneous players. If f is a β-
deviated Nash flow for I, then f is an ǫ-approximate Nash flow for I with ǫij = βγij
for all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [hi] (for the same demand distribution r).
Proof. Let f be a β-deviated Nash flow for some set of path deviations δ ∈ ∆(0, β).
For P ∈ S, we have
lP (f) ≤ lP + γijδP (f) ≤ lP ′(f) + γijδP ′(f) ≤ (1 + γijβ)lP ′(f)
where we use the non-negativity of δP (f) in the first inequality, the Nash condition for
f in the second inequality, and the fact that δP ′(f) ≤ βlP ′(f) in the third inequality.
By definition, it now holds that f is also a ǫ-approximate equilibrium (for ǫ = βγ). ⊓⊔
Theorem 1. Let I be a network congestion game on a series-parallel graph with hetero-
geneous players, demand distribution r = (ri)i∈[h] normalized to 1, i.e.,
∑
j∈[h] ri = 1,
and sensitivity distribution γ = (γi)i∈[h], with γ1 < γ2 < · · · < γh. Let β ≥ 0 be
fixed and define ǫ = (βγi)i∈[h]. Then the ǫ-stability ratio and the β-deviation ratio are
bounded by:
ǫ-SR(I) ≤ 1 + β
h∑
j=1
rjγj and β-DR(I) ≤ 1 + β ·max
j∈[h]
{
γj
( h∑
p=j
rp
)}
. (11)
Further, both bounds are tight for all distributions r and γ.
A.1 Proof of statement for ǫ-SR(I).
Proof (Theorem 1, ǫ-stability ratio). The statement for ǫ-approximate equilibria can be
proven almost similar as in Kleer and Scha¨fer [6] (the bound there is used for path
deviations, but the proof extends directly to approximate equilibria). For completeness,
we give the argument here.
For j ∈ [k], let P¯j be a path maximizing lP (x) over all flow-carrying paths P ∈ P
of type j. Moreover, there exists a path π such that xa ≤ za and za > 0 for all a ∈ π
(see, e.g., Milchtaich [11]). We then have (this is also reminiscent of an argument by
Lianeas et al. [8]):
lP¯j (x) ≤ (1 + βγj)lπ(x) = (1 + βγj)
∑
a∈π
la(xa).
Note that, by definition of the alternating path π, we have xa ≤ za for all a ∈ π.
Continuing with the estimate, we find lP¯j (x) ≤ (1 + βγj)
∑
a∈π la(za) and thus
C(x) ≤
∑
j∈[h]
rj lP¯j (x) ≤
∑
j∈[h]
rj(1 + βγj)
∑
a∈π
la(za) = C(z)
( ∑
j∈[h]
rj(1 + βγj)
)
Since
∑
j∈[h] rj = 1, we get the desired result. Note that we use C(z) =
∑
a∈π la(za),
which is true because there exists a flow-decomposition of z in which π is flow-carrying
(here we use za > 0 for all a ∈ π).
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Tightness follows by considering an instance with arc set {0, 1, . . . , h} where the
zeroth arc has latency l0(y) = 1 and the arcs j ∈ {1, . . . , h} have latency lj(y) =
1 + βγj . An original Nash flow is given by f
0 = (z0, z1, . . . , zh) = (1, 0, . . . , 0), and
an ǫ-approximate Nash flow is given by f ǫ = (x0, x1, . . . , xh) = (0, r1, r2, . . . , rh).
⊓⊔
A.2 Missing arguments for proof of β-deviation ratio.
Lemma 1. Let 0 ≤ τk−1 ≤ · · · ≤ τ1 ≤ τ0 and ci ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , k be given. Then
c1τ0 +
k−1∑
i=1
(ci+1 − ci)τi ≤ τ0 · max
i=1,...,k
{ci}.
Proof. The statement is clearly true for k = 1. Now suppose the statement is true for
some k ∈ N. We will prove the statement for k + 1.
Case 1: ck+1 − ck ≤ 0. Then we have
c1τ0 +
k∑
i=1
(ci+1 − ci)τi ≤ c1τ0 +
k−1∑
i=1
(ci+1 − ci)τi (using τk ≥ 0)
≤ τ0 · max
i=1,...,k
{ci} (using induction hypothesis)
≤ τ0 · max
i=1,...,k+1
{ci} (using non-negativity of τ0)
Case 2: ck+1 − ck > 0.
c1τ0 +
k∑
i=1
(ci+1 − ci)τi = c1τ0 +
[ k−1∑
i=1
(ci+1 − ci)τi
]
+ (ck+1 − ck)τk
≤ c1τ0 +
[ k−1∑
i=1
(ci+1 − ci)τi
]
+ (ck+1 − ck)τk−1 (τk ≤ τk−1)
= c1τ0 +
[ k−2∑
i=1
(ci+1 − ci)τi
]
+ (ck+1 − ck−1)τk−1
≤ τ0 · max
i=1,...,k−2,k−1,k+1
{ci} (using induction hypothesis)
≤ τ0 · max
i=1,...,k+1
{ci} (using non-negativity of τ0)
Note that we apply the induction hypothesis with the set {c1, . . . , ck−1, ck+1} of size
k. ⊓⊔
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Induction step to prove inequality (5) in proof of Theorem 1: The case j = 1 is
precisely (4). Now suppose it holds for some j, then we have
lPj+1(x) ≤ lPj (x) + γj+1δPj (x) − γj+1δPj+1(x) (Nash condition for path Pj+1)
≤ lP0(x) + γ1δP0(x) +
[ j−1∑
g=1
(γg+1 − γg)δPg (x)
]
− γjδPj (x)
+ γj+1δPj (x)− γj+1δPj+1 (x) (induction hypothesis)
= lP0(x) + γ1δP0(x) +
[ j∑
g=1
(γg+1 − γg)δPg (x)
]
− γj+1δPj+1(x),
which shows the result for j + 1. ⊓⊔
A.3 Bounded deviation model for (0, β)-path deviations and general sensitivity
density distributions (single-commodity case).
We use the section to explain the generalization of the bounds in Theorem 1 to more
general sensitivity density distributions (see Corollary 1 further on). For sake of com-
pleteness, we adjust the definitions given in the description of the bounded deviation
model (see Section 2). We are given a single-commodity instance I = (E, (le)e∈E ,S)
and β ≥ 0 fixed. We consider the set
∆(0, β) = {δ = (δP )P∈S
∣∣ 0 ≤ δP (f) ≤ βlP (f) for all f ∈ F(S)}
of (0, β)-path deviation vectors δ = (δP )P∈S where δP : F(S) → R≥0 for all P ∈ S.
Moreover we have a Lesbesgue integrable (or just continuous) density function ψ :
R≥0 → R≥0 over the the demand, which is normalized to 1, i.e.,
∫∞
0
φ(y)dy = 1. For
feasible flow f , we have an indicator function
I : S × [0,∞)→ {0, 1}
which is 1 if sensitivity γ ∈ [0,∞) is present on path P in flow f , and 0 otherwise.
Define the deviated latency of a path P ∈ Si for sensitivity class j ∈ [hi] as
qjP (f) = lP (f) + γijδP (f). We say that a flow f is a β-deviated Nash flow if there
exist some β-bounded path deviations δ ∈ ∆(β) such that
∀γ[0,∞), ∀s ∈ S with I(P, γ) = 1 : qjP (f) ≤ q
j
P ′(f) ∀P
′ ∈ S. (12)
We define the β-deviation ratio β-DR(I) as the maximum ratio C(fβ)/C(f0) of an
β-deviated Nash flow fβ and an original Nash flow f0.
The result of Theorem 1 for general sensitivity demand functions (as mentioned at the
end of Section 3) can now be stated as follows.
Corollary 1. Let I be a network congestion game on a series-parallel graph with
heterogeneous players, given by a Lebesgue integrable demand density function ψ :
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R≥0 → R≥0. Let β ≥ 0 be fixed and let ǫ = (βγi)i∈[h]. Then the ǫ-stability ratio and
the β-deviation ratio are bounded by:
ǫ-SR(I) ≤ 1 + β
∫ ∞
0
y · ψ(y)dy and β-DR(I) ≤ 1 + β sup
t∈R≥0
{
t ·
∫ ∞
t
ψ(y)dy
}
.
(13)
Further, both bounds are asymptotically tight for all distributions r and γ.
Proof. We first show that we can reduce to a discrete instance as considered in Theorem
1. For every path P ∈ S we can set the sensitivity of all the flow on that path to
γ∗P = inf{γ : I(P, γ) = 1}.
In particular, this induces a demand distribution over a discrete (finite) valued sensitivity
population (here we implicitly use the continuity of the latency functions). The upper
bounds in Theorem 1 for the resulting sensitivity distributions will never be worse than
the quantities in (13). This concludes the proofs of the upper bounds (since the result
now follows from the proof of Theorem 1).
For tightness of the β-deviation ratio, fix t ∈ [0,∞), and let T =
∫∞
t φ(y)dy.
Consider the following instance on two arcs. We take (l1(y), δ1(y)) = (1, β) and take
(l2(y), δ2(y)) with δ2(y) = 0 and l2(y) a strictly increasing function satisfying l2(0) =
1+ ǫ′ and l2(T ) = 1 + t · β, where ǫ
′ < t · β. The (unique) original Nash flow is given
by z = (z1, z2) = (1, 0) with C(z) = 1, and the (unique) deviated Nash flow x is
given by x = (x1, x2) = (1− T, T ) with C(x) = 1 + β · γ · T . Since this construction
holds for all t ∈ [0,∞), the bound in (13) is asymptotically tight. This holds since we
can get arbitrarily close to the supremum if it is finite, and otherwise we can create a
sequence of instances of which its ratio goes approaches infinity in case the supremum
is not finite.
For tightness of the ǫ-stability ratio, we create a discretized version of the construc-
tion in the proof of Theorem 1. Fix some arbitrary A > 0. Choose α large enough so
that
A =
∫ ∞
α
ψ(y)dy
For the density underα, we discretize the interval [0, α] into the intervals [k·ǫ′, (k+1)ǫ′]
where k = 0, . . . , q for some q = α/ǫ′ (without loss of generality q can be assumed
to be integral, and it can be chosen as large as desired). We then consider the discrete
demand distribution r = (r1, . . . , rq, A), where
ri =
∫ (k+1)ǫ′
kǫ′
ψ(y)dy.
We then create an instance with q + 1 arcs, with latency functions lk(y) = (1 + kǫ
′)
for k = 1, . . . , q and lq+1(y) = 1 +A. We now can use the same construction as in the
proof of statement (11), and by sending A, ǫ′ → 0 we can get arbitrarily close to the
value 1+ β
∫∞
0
y ·ψ(y)dy. Note that the number of arcs in the instance goes to infinity
as A, ǫ′ → 0. ⊓⊔
16
B Omitted material of Section 4
Proposition 2. Let I be a single-commodity congestion game with homogeneous play-
ers. f is an ǫ-approximate Nash flow for I if and only if f is a β-deviated Nash flow for
I with ǫ = βγ.
Proof. The first part of the proof is a special case of the proof of Proposition 1. Let f
be a β-deviated Nash flow for some set of path deviations δ ∈ ∆(0, β). For P ∈ S, we
have
lP (f) ≤ lP + γδP (f) ≤ lP ′(f) + γδP ′(f) ≤ (1 + γβ)lP ′(f)
where we use the non-negativity of δP (f) in the first inequality, the Nash condition for
f in the second inequality, and the fact that δP ′(f) ≤ βlP ′(f) in the third inequality.
By definition, it now holds that f is also a ǫ-approximate equilibrium (for ǫ = βγ).
Reversely, let f be a ǫ-approximate Nash flow (w.l.o.g., we can take γ = 1, so that
β = ǫ). We show that there exist (0, β)-path deviations δP such that f is inducible with
respect to these path deviations. Let P1, . . . , Pk be the set of flow-carrying paths under
f , and assume without loss of generality that lP1(f) ≤ lP2(f) ≤ · · · ≤ lPk(f). We
define δPi(f) = lPk(f) − lPi(f) for i = 1, . . . , k. Using the Nash condition for the
path Pk, we find
δPi(f) = lPk(f)− lPi(f) ≤ (1 + β)lPi(f)− lPi(f) = βlPi(f)
which shows that these path deviations are feasible. Moreover,we take δQ(f) = βlQ(f)
for all the paths Q ∈ P \ {P1, . . . , Pk} which are not flow-carrying under f . Now, let
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} be fixed. Then for any j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we have
lPi(f) + δPi(f) = lPk(f) = lPj (f) + δPj (f)
and for anyQ ∈ P \ {P1, . . . , Pk}, we have
lPi(f) + δPi(f) = lPk(f) ≤ (1 + β)lQ(f) = lQ(f) + δQ(f),
using the Nash condition for the path Pk and the definition of δQ(f). This shows that f
is indeed a β-deviated Nash flow. ⊓⊔
Generalized Braess graph. The m-th (generalized) Braess graph Gm = (V m, Am)
is defined by V m = {s, v1, . . . , vm−1, w1, . . . , wm−1, t} and Am as the union of three
sets: Em1 = {(s, vj), (vj , wj), (wj , t) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}, E
m
2 = {(vj , wj−1) : 2 ≤ j ≤
m} and Em3 = {(v1, t) ∪ {(s, wm−1}} (see Figure 2 for an example).
Theorem 3. Let n = 2m be fixed and let Bm be the set of all instances on the general-
ized Braess graph with n nodes. Then
sup
I∈Bm
ǫ-SR(I) =
{
1+ǫ
1−ǫ·(⌊n/2⌋−1) if ǫ <
1
⌊n/2⌋−1 ,
∞ otherwise.
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The proof of the upper bound for ǫ < 1/(⌊n/2⌋− 1) follows from the discussion in
the main text of Section 4. That is, we either have a path consisting solely ofZ-edges (in
which case we get a bound of 1 + ǫ which follows from similar arguments as the proof
of Theorem 1) or we have an alternating path qi = 1 for all sections of consecutive
X-edges in the alternating path (in Figure 2, these are the edges with latency T ). That
is, every such section consists of one edge inX .
Proof (Lower bound for ǫ ≥ 1/(⌊n/2⌋ − 1)). Let τ ≥ 0 be a fixed constant. Let
ym : R≥0 → R≥0 be a non-decreasing, continuous function with ym(1/m) = 0 and
ym(1/(m− 1)) = τ . We define
lma (g) =


(m− j) · ym(g) for a ∈ {(s, vj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}
j · ym(g) for a ∈ {(wj , t) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}
1 for a ∈ {(vi, wi−1) : 2 ≤ i ≤ m− 1} ∪ E3
(1 + ǫ) + ((m− 1)ǫ− 1)τ for a ∈ {(vi, wi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1}
Note that lma is non-negative for all a ∈ A. This is clear for the first three cases, and the
last case follows from the assumption ǫ ≥ 1/(m− 1).
s v3
v4
v2
v1
w4
w3
w2
w1
t
1
ym(
x)
2ym(x)
3y
m(x)
4y
m (x)
T
1
T
1
T
1
T
4y
m(x)
3y
m(x)
2ym(x)
ym(
x)
1
Fig. 2. The fifth Braess graph with l5a on the arcs as defined in the proof of Theorem 3, with
T = (1 + ǫ) + ((m− 1)ǫ − 1)τ . The bold arcs indicate the alternating path π1.
A Nash flow z = f0 is given by routing 1/m units of flow over the paths
(s, wm−1, t), (s, v1, t) and the paths in {(s, vj , wj−1, t) : 2 ≤ j ≤ m − 1}. Note
that all these paths have latency one, and the path (s, vj , wj , t), for some 1 ≤ m ≤ j,
has latency (1 + ǫ) + ((m − 1)ǫ − 1)τ ≥ 1 for all τ ≥ 0 and ǫ ≥ 1/(m − 1). We
conclude that C(z) = 1.
An ǫ-approximate Nash flow x = f ǫ is given by routing 1/(m − 1) units of flow
over the paths in {(s, vj , wj , t) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}. Each such path P then has a latency
of
lP (x) = (1 + ǫ) + ((m− 1)ǫ− 1)τ + (m− j + j)τ = (1 + ǫ)(1 + (m− 1)τ).
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Furthermore, we have lP (x) = (1 + ǫ)lP ′(x) for all P
′ = (s, vj , wj−1, t), where
2 ≤ j ≤ m − 1. The same argument holds for the paths (s, wm−1, t) and (s, v1, t),
so x is indeed an ǫ-approximate Nash flow. We have C(x) = (1 + ǫ)(1 + (m − 1)τ).
Sending τ →∞ then gives the desired result. ⊓⊔
Proof (Lower bound for ǫ < 1/(⌊n/2⌋ − 1)). Let ym : R≥0 → R≥0 be a non-
decreasing, continuous function with ym(1/m) = 0 and ym(1/(m − 1)) = ǫ/(1 −
ǫ · (m− 1)). We define
lma (g) =


(m− j) · ym(g) for a ∈ {(s, vj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}
j · ym(g) for a ∈ {(wj , t) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}
1 for a ∈ {(vi, wi−1) : 2 ≤ i ≤ m− 1} ∪ E3
1 for a ∈ {(vi, wi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1}
Note that lma is non-negative for all a ∈ A.
A Nash flow z = f0 is given by routing 1/m units of flow over the paths
(s, wm−1, t), (s, v1, t) and the paths in {(s, vj , wj−1, t) : 2 ≤ j ≤ m − 1}. Note
that all these paths have latency one, and the path (s, vj , wj , t), for 1 ≤ m ≤ j, has
latency one as well. We conclude that C(z) = 1.
An ǫ-approximate Nash flow x = f ǫ is given by routing 1/(m − 1) units of flow
over the paths in {(s, vj , wj , t) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}. Each such path P then has a latency
of
lP (x) = 1 + (m− j + j) ·
ǫ
1− ǫ · (m− 1)
=
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ · (m− 1)
.
Furthermore, for all P ′ = (s, vj , wj−1, t), where 2 ≤ j ≤ m− 1, we have
(1 + ǫ)lP ′(x) = (1 + ǫ)
(
1 + (m− 1) ·
ǫ
1− ǫ · (m− 1)
)
= lP (x)
The same argument holds for the paths (s, wm−1, t) and (s, v1, t), so x is indeed an
ǫ-approximate Nash flow. The result now follows since C(x)/C(z) = (1 + ǫ)/(1− ǫ ·
(m− 1)) as desired. ⊓⊔
B.1 Unboundedness of the ǫ-stability ratio for matroid congestion games.
We first show that the ratio between a β-approximate Nash flow and an original Nash
flow can, in general, be unbounded.
Theorem 5. Let ǫ ≥ 0 fixed and let J = (E, (le)e∈E ,S) be a single-commodity ma-
troid congestion game in which S contains all subsets of E of precisely size k. Then
sup
J
ǫ-SR(J ) ≥
{ 1+ǫ
1−ǫ(k−1) if ǫ < 1/(k − 1)
∞ if ǫ ≥ 1/(k − 1),
For k = 2, the resulting lower bound (1 + ǫ)/(1 − ǫ) for ǫ < 1 is tight (i.e., it is also
an upper bound). This settles the case of k = 2 completely.
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Proof (Unboundedness). Fix some k ∈ N and consider an instance with demand r = 1
and E = {e0, . . . , ek}, and, as stated above, let S be the family of all subsets of size k.
Let l0(y) = 1 be the constant latency function of resource e0 and for e ∈ {e1, . . . , ek},
let le(y) be a non-negative, continuous, increasing function satisfying
le((k − 1)/k) = 1 and le(1) = M,
whereM is a constant to be determined later.
A classical Nash flow z = f0 is given by assigning 1/k units of flow to the strategies
E \ {ej} for j = 1, . . . , k, so that the load on e0 is z0 = 1, and the load on resources
ej is xj = (k − 1)/k. Every strategy has latency k (since le((k − 1)/k) = 1 for all
resources j ∈ {1, . . . , k}), and therefore also C(z) = k.
We construct an ǫ-approximate Nash flow x = f ǫ as follows.The flow x is defined
by assigning all flow to the strategy s = {e1, . . . , ek}. For suitable choices of M ,
we show that x is then indeed an ǫ-approximate Nash flow. The set of other strategies
is given by sj = E \ {ej} for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The Nash conditions for x are then
equivalent to
ls(x) = k ·M ≤ (1 + ǫ)[1 + (k − 1)M ] = lsj (x) (14)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If ǫ ≥ 1/(k − 1), then 1 ≤ ǫ(k − 1), and thus
k ·M ≤ 1+ǫ+(k−1)M+M ≤ 1+ǫ+(k−1)M+ǫ(k−1)M = (1+ǫ)(1+(k−1)M)
for any non-negativeM , i.e., the Nash conditions are always satisfied. Note thatC(x) =
kM so that C(x)/C(z) = M → ∞ as M → ∞. Therefore the ǫ-ratio is unbounded
for ǫ ≥ 1/(k − 1).
If ǫ < 1/(k − 1), then the Nash condition in (14) is equivalent to
M ≤
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ(k − 1)
which is strictly positive since ǫ < 1/(k − 1). In particular, by choosing M = (1 +
ǫ)/(1 − ǫ(k − 1)), we get C(x)/C(z) = (k ·M)/k = (1 + ǫ)/(1 − ǫ(k − 1)) for
ǫ < 1/(k − 1). ⊓⊔
For the case k = 2, the construction in the previous proof yields a lower bound
of (1 + ǫ)/(1 − ǫ) if ǫ < 1, and ∞ otherwise. For ǫ < 1, we show that the bound
(1 + ǫ)/(1− ǫ) is also an upper bound.
Proof (Upper bound for k = 2). Let z = f0 be a classical Nash flow and let x = f ǫ
be a worst-case ǫ-approximate Nash flow (both with normalized demand r = 1). We
partition E = X ∪ Z , where Z = {a ∈ E : za ≥ xa and za > 0} and X = {a ∈ E :
za < xa or za = xa = 0}.
Let us first elaborate on the structure of the flow z. One of the following cases holds.
i) There are two resources e and e′ which are used by every player, that is, all flow
is assigned to the strategy {e, e′}. By definition, both these resources will then be
part of Z (since xa ≤ 1 = za for a = e, e′).
20
ii) There is precisely one resource e0 used by every player. Again, this resource will
then be part of Z by definition. Moreover, we then also have
le0(1) = le0(ze) ≤ le′(ze′)
for every other resource e′. Also, all other resources e′ with ze′ > 0 have equal la-
tency (which is true because of base exchange arguments), which in turn is greater
or equal than that of e0.
iii) There are no resources which are used by every player. Then all flow-carrying
resources in z have equal latency (again because of base exchange arguments).
Claim 1:Without loss of generality, there is at most one resource in Z .
Proof. If there are at least two resources in Z , then there exists a pair of resources
in Z , forming a strategy with a strictly positive amount of flow assigned to it in z
(by what was said above regarding the structure of z).9 Using the fact that matroids
are immune against the Braess paradox, as shown by Fujishige et al. [5], we can then
carry out similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1 for the β-deviation ratio,
but then for the more simple homogeneous case.10 This would result in a bound of
1 + ǫ ≤ (1 + ǫ)/(1− ǫ). ⊓⊔
Let Pmax be a strategy maximizing lP (x) over all flow-carrying strategies P in x.
Claim 2: Without loss of generality, Pmax uses only resources in X (and not the re-
source e0 in Z).
Proof. Suppose that every strategy with maximum latency is of the form {f, e0} for
some resource f ∈ E \ {e0}. Let {f1, . . . , fq} be the set of all such resources f . It
follows that, for any fixed j = 1, . . . , q, the strategy {e, fj}, for some e ∈ E \ {e0},
cannot be flow-carrying, otherwise,
le0(xe0 ) ≤ le0(ze0) (definition of Z)
≤ le(ze) (structure of Nash flow z discussed above)
≤ le(xe) (definition ofX)
which implies that le0(xe0 )+lfj(xfj ) ≤ le(xe)+lfj(xfj ). Since {e0, fj} is a strategy of
maximum latency, then also {e, fj} is a strategy of maximum latency, which contradicts
our assumption.
Moreover, not all players in x can use resource e0, otherwise 1 = xe0 ≤ ze0 , mean-
ing that also all players use resource e0 in z. But since xe > ze for all other resources,
which are inX since we have only one resource in Z , this leads to a contradiction, since
the total flow on all edges in x is then higher than the total flow on all edges in z.
9 We emphasize that this is not necessarily true for all combinations of resources in Z.
10 Phrased differently, the proof of Theorem 1 for the β-deviation ratio essentially relies on the
fact that for the flow z we can without loss of generality assume that all latency functions of
resources in Z are constant (by using immunity against the Braess paradox), and that there
exists a strategy, with positive amount of flow assigned to it in z, only using resources in Z.
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Now, let {a, b} be a flow-carrying strategy for some a, b ∈ E\{e0}, which exists by
what was said above. For any flow-carrying strategy of the form {a, e} for some e ∈ E,
we have
la(xa) + le(xe) ≤ lPmax(x) ≤ (1 + β)lP (x)
for any other strategy P . We can then raise the value of la(xa) until the latency of
some strategy of the form {a, e} becomes tight with respect to lPmax(x). Note that,
since a ∈ X , we have xa > za and therefore this does not contradict the fact that
la is non-decreasing. More precisely, we replace la by some function lˆa(y) which is
non-negative, continuous and non-decreasing, and that satisfies lˆa(za) = la(za) and
lˆa(xa) = la(xa) + α, where α is the smallest value such that la(xa) + α + le(xe) =
lPmax(x) for some flow-carrying resource of the form {e, a}. If a 6= e0, we have found
the desired result, and otherwise, we can use a similar argument as in the beginning of
the claim to show that {a, b} is also a flow-carrying strategy with maximum latency.
Note that the social cost C(x) of x can only get worse if we replace the function la by
lˆa. ⊓⊔
We now use Claims 1 and 2 to establish the bound (1 + ǫ)/(1 − ǫ) for ǫ < 1. Let
Pmax = {a, b} for a, b ∈ E \ {e0} (which is justified because of Claim 2). The Nash
conditions then give (by comparing {a, b} with {a, e0} and {b, e0})
la(xa) + lb(xb) ≤ (1 + ǫ)[la(xa) + le0(xe0 )]
la(xa) + lb(xb) ≤ (1 + ǫ)[lb(xb) + le0(xe0 )]
Adding up these inequalities, and rewriting, gives
(1− ǫ)[la(xa) + lb(xb)] ≤ (1 + ǫ)[le0(xe0 ) + le0(xe0)] (15)
By definition of Z , we have le0(xe0 ) ≤ le0(ze0), and, moreover, by the structure of the
flow z (as discussed in the beginning of the proof), we have le0(ze0) ≤ le(ze) for any
other resource with ze > 0. On top of that, it also holds that le0(ze0) + le(ze) = C(z),
for any e with ze > 0, because of the fact that the demand is normalized to r = 1.
Combining all this implies that le0(xe0) + le0(xe0 ) ≤ C(z). Using this observation,
combined with (15), and the fact that ǫ < 1, it follows that
C(x) ≤ la(xa) + lb(xb) ≤
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ
· [le0(xe0 ) + le0(xe0 )] ≤
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ
· C(z)
which is the desired result. ⊓⊔
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. Let J = (E, (le)e∈E , (Si)i∈[k], (ri)i∈[k]) be a matroid congestion game
with homogeneous players. Let β ≥ 0 be fixed and consider β-bounded basis deviations
as defined above. Then the β-deviation ratio is upper bounded by β-DR(J ) ≤ 1 + β.
Further, this bound is tight already for 1-uniform matroid congestion games.
Proof. The proof consists of establishing the following two claims.
22
i) We have le(xe) ≤ (1 + β)le(ze) for all e ∈ E with xe > ze.
ii) It holds that ∑
e:xe>ze
(xe − ze)le(xe) ≤ (1 + β)
∑
e:ze≥xe
(ze − xe)le(xe).
From these two claims, the result can be derived as follows. Rewriting the inequality in
ii), we find∑
e:xe>ze
xele(xe) ≤
∑
e:xe>ze
zele(xe) + (1 + β)
∑
e:ze≥xe
(ze − xe)le(xe).
Adding
∑
e:ze≥xe
xele(xe) to both sides of the inequality, and using the definition of
C(x), implies
C(x) ≤
∑
e:xe>ze
zele(xe) + (1 + β)
∑
e:ze≥xe
zele(xe)− β
∑
e:ze≥xe
xele(xe)
In the first term, we now use that the fact that le(xe) ≤ (1 + β)le(ze) for every e in
this summation, because of i); in the second term, we use the fact that le(xe) ≤ le(ze)
for all resources e in the summation (which follows from ze ≥ xe and the fact that
the latency functions are non-decreasing); the third term is left out using the fact that
β
∑
e:ze≥xe
xele(xe) ≥ 0 because of the non-negativity of the latency functions and β.
This then implies that
C(x) ≤ (1 + β)
∑
e:xe>ze
zele(ze) + (1 + β)
∑
e:ze≥xe
zele(ze)− 0 = (1 + β)C(z)
which gives the desired result.
It now remains to show that i) and ii) holds. We first prove i), of which the proof is
of a similar nature as a proof of Fujishige et al. [5]. In particular, using similar arguments
as Lemma 3.2 [5], it can be shown that for every e ∈ E with xe > ze, there exists an
f ∈ E \ {e} with zf > xf such that
le(xe) + δe(xe) ≤ lf (xf ) + δ(xf ) and lf(zf ) ≤ le(ze).11
The proof of this argument uses the fact that x is a Nash flow w.r.t. the costs le + δe,
and z a Nash flows w.r.t. to the latencies le. It follows that
le(xe) ≤ le(xe)+δe(xe) ≤ lf (xf )+δ(xf ) ≤ (1+β)lf (xf ) ≤ (1+β)lf(zf ) ≤ (1+β)le(ze)
using the fact that 0 ≤ δe(xe) ≤ βle(xe) and the properties of the resources e and f .
We now prove the second claim. We use a ‘variational inequality’ argument similar
to, e.g., the proof of Theorem 4 [8]. Because of the fact that x is β-deviated Nash flow,
it follows that ∑
e∈E
xe(le(xe) + δe(xe)) ≤
∑
e∈E
ze(le(xe) + δe(xe)).
11 We refer the reader to the proof of Lemma 3.2 [5] for details. We omit it here for notational
reasons.
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Rewriting gives∑
e:xe>ze
(xe − ze)(le(xe) + δe(xe)) ≤
∑
e:ze≥xe
(ze − xe)(le(xe) + δe(xe)).
Using the fact that 0 ≤ δe(xe) ≤ βle(xe) it follows that∑
e:xe>ze
(xe−ze)le(xe) ≤
∑
e:ze≥xe
(ze−xe)(le(xe)+δe(xe)) ≤ (1+β)
∑
e:ze≥xe
(ze−xe)le(xe)
which completes the proof.
Tightness follows, e.g., from a similar construction as in the last tightness construc-
tion of the proof of Theorem 1 (if applied to a homogeneous population). ⊓⊔
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